Mechanism Design
Vickrey–Clarke–Groves, Myerson's optimal auction, and strategy-proofness.
Mechanism Design. Vickrey–Clarke–Groves, Myerson’s optimal auction, and strategy-proofness.
Foundations and canonical references
The standard treatments of mechanism design approach the subject from complementary angles. Nisan, Algorithmic Game Theory (2007) is the anchor reference for the subject and lays out the core definitions, theorems, and worked examples that practitioners return to.
Supporting and adjacent work
A number of supporting contributions sharpen specific aspects of mechanism design or connect it to neighbouring problems. Optimal auction design (Myerson, 1981) contributes to this area as one of the supporting references that inform current practice.
Open methodological questions for mechanism design include sharpening the bridges between foundational theory and computational practice, extending classical results to broader or more structured settings, and integrating the techniques surveyed above with adjacent mathematical disciplines. The references listed in this page are the entry points that current work builds on.
Prerequisites
Sources
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- textbook · primary · 2007Algorithmic Game Theorynisan-2007, roughgarden-2007, tardos-2007, vazirani-2007
In context
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